"Third, several variables vary smoothly between the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods, including sociodemographic variables, economic structure, unemployment rates, tax revenues, eligibility for EU structural funds, geography, voter turnout, and referendum outcomes. The discontinuity generated by migrating Nazi elites is a unique exception."
So those elites made the far-right bigger, but the far-right being bigger had no measured effect on those other outcomes? Evidence that local politics don't matter, or that far-right parties don't matter?
It really shocks me that the "Genosphere" is surprised by Hanania's retard take on immigration: he is a (non White) immigrant. How can you expect a person that, without his ancestors' immigration in the USA, would be in Gaza to be against immigration?
Moreover, but his preference to market economy, Hanania too is a "left-leaning immigrant": his whole political position is "Clinton's sister Souljah moment". His "immigrants stop the welfare state" is a thesaurus-translation of "diversity is our strenght".
The same can be said about Kirkegaard and aNAFOly Karlin: the first is an individualistic Scandinavian scared that collectivist immigrants would export socialist Denmark in the USA, Karlin is a russian nationalist that copes his expat status with his "international human capital"...delirium.
People belive in what they are: is really this simple.
I got the meaning, not the point: I did not say "Hanania is wrong because he is an immigrant" but "you should not be surprised that he chose a wrong point on immigration because he is an immigrant".
110 years ago Palestine was an undeveloped backwater that mass immigration of high human capital migrants lifted to a highly developed economy. I'm sure the current descendants of the original population really appreciate the increased GDP that the new migrant elite created.
1) After 2020 I started to change my mind on high IQ immigration. From "it's great" to "its neutral and complicated."
High IQ immigration basically just means "Asians" and the way Asians behaved during COVID was incredibly discrediting. I would not trade wearing a mask all day for slightly higher GDP.
I would add that pretty much the entire last twenty years has been bad for Asia (they are literally going extinct of their own volition).
I would probably still welcome some 130+ IQ STEM people, but I don't really care about whether we have more mediocre desk warmers.
2) In general non-white elites and low IQ browns all favor more socialism. Asians are naturally into the administrative state and safetyism. Browns don't really have an ideology but they understand "gibsmedat". Southern White hatred of Southern Blacks helped the Southeast keep the welfare state at bay for awhile, but there really is no evidence that mass importation of Latins has done anything other then turn places like CA from Reagan to Newsome or help people like Obama defeat Romney.
The default we've seen is more immigration = democrats win elections = more welfare state. You've got to lie to yourself to get to any other conclusion.
In my experience the Indian expats vote for the Democrats, but the Chinese and Columbian tend to vote conservative and the Ukrainian can tell you what the current left progressive movement has in common with communism. I believe the Hispanics tend to be more conservative as well.
A caveat to the Chinese, I think the non politically active ones, which are most, tend to vote conservative (my dad loves Trump) but the politically active ones are all heavily left leaning. And I think it's probably the same for the Indians and other non-white minority groups
If the United States is to have immigration, it should strongly favor the highly intelligent. Intelligence is one of the most important human traits. The United States is quite capable of producing more than enough low-intelligence people to meet its needs.
>likely the most sudden and impactful blossoming forth of human capital in the history of mankind. Nowhere else has an extremely gifted and persecuted population been freed like this
What about the liberalization of the entire China after the death of Mao?
>Likewise, we see something curious when we look at probate rates by region of death: they’re clearly less common in the north!
Shouldn't they be *more* common in the north?
There are a few typos in the post:
>But before getting to that, it’s reasonable to might suggest this migration didn’t have a causal effect
>Ochsner & Roesel were able to used 1949 election data
>Europe’s Jews were like a kettle getting read to boil over
>The split among non-Jews were only 17 points in net conservatism
1) strong implication that to "destroy a group as a class" destroying its members as living bodies is necessary (something both the early Soviet and the Nazis realized to horrific results).
2) how does importing of the elites interact with how receptive the receiver society is to the ideas and beliefs they bring? Nazis moving around Austria or Southern plantation owners in the US or even Luther's travels all seem to be occuring withing ROUGHLY the same cultural milieu. Idk if it even matters in the current globalised world of ideas, but there might be a point where the imported elite beliefs are so incompatible with host culture (idk, radical Islamism or other totalitarian religiosity brought to secular north-west democracies ??) that they won't take even if carried by very able group of incomers.
3) trying to cognitively integrate this with, largely measuring as paltry, but limited by the conditions of measurement, effects of family environment on human outcomes -- but also awareness that at the edges (extremely disadvantageous, hard-abusive family environments) those effects seem to be much stronger. Perhaps the same is true in the other tail: parents mostly don't matter all that much, but extra special awful parents AND extra special able/intelligent/creative parents possessing of well formed beliefs and ideas matter significantly more. I wonder if there's any research that looks at those potentially non-linear effects.
In the beginning of the article, you mentioned that hereditary ideological effects can be attributed to genetics, tho only if the offspring is smart. Is this a claim that you hold strongly? Because imo, intelligence indicates ability to absorb information, which in my view, explains the ideological preferences of offsprings more than genetics.
I'm not sure how to answer that. It seems to be empirically supported, so I believe it, but if evidence came along showing something else more strongly, I could believe that instead.
When it comes to footnote 1, what are your thoughts on the report about the fiscal impact of migration in the netherlands("Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances"), seemed to show a negative impact even when looking across the entire lifetime and across generations for most immigrants. I guess this would not be robust to the interaction effects mentioned. It would be interesting to see a study looking at say if non-immigrant populations are wealthier in places with more (low-skilled) immigrants as suggesting by a pulling up effect, even after controls. Also the section on CITO scores(dutch standardized test that strongly correlates with iq), being strongly correlated with net contributions by country of origin, given research showing that this measure correlates with other socioeconomic outcomes on this level(education is mentioned on the individual level, but see Kirkegaard, 2017), and previous correlations between national iq(Jones, 2010, see a basic meta-analysis: https://rpubs.com/EmilOWK/LCI_2017_talk), and sometimes selection(https://inquisitivebird.substack.com/p/out-of-europe-history-of-migrations used iab brain drain data) and immigrant outcomes(and those two factors + environmental impacts would be the main factors behind CITO performance).
*assuming measurement invariance for national iqs, see lasker,2019(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335239154_A_Surfeit_of_Evidence_on_Spearman's_Hypothesis) and warne,2023 for tests of this, generally showing that international measuerement invariance is tenable, even if say strict factorial invariance is not. And for educational selection, depending if the selection is direct or indirect(on a broader SES), your estimate would have to be corrected for the correlation between education and iq(if you actually wanted to estimate the results for migrants to x country).
Also when it comes to the NAS reports, it would be interesting to see the impact of adjustments for the limitation of income, taxes and transfers in CPS data, discussed by Auten & Splinter(2023), Early, Ekelund, and Gramm(2022), which also had data on income differences by race/ethnicity , etc. Data on the impact in europe generally use register data of the whole population to get around this problem.
Kirkegaard 2017 found a strong correlation between net contributions by country of origin in denmark and finland and socioecomic status, national iq and (national) muslim%(https://openpsych.net/paper/53/)
When it comes to the data on income measurement, the undercounting of income in the CPS, at the high end because of topcoding, for taxes and transfers(for example child anti-poverty programs shown in Meyer et al. 2020, social security and disability benefits and unemployment benefits( Larrimore, Mortenson, and Splinter (2022)). The CPS also poorly captures retirement income according to Bee and Mitchell (2017). Also see https://www.davidsplinter.com/LMS-2022-NAS-Population-Income-in-Tax-Data.pdf for a discussion of differences. This is relevant because it has a major impact on the measurement of the change in inequality(https://davidsplinter.com/AutenSplinter-Inequality-slides.pdf and https://www.cato.org/study/myth-american-income-inequality for examples), progressivity(the US probably has one of the most progressive tax + transfer systems in the world, even if it's relatively smaller, see previous slides by auten and splinter, also discussed in the book the myth of american ineuqlaity pg 276-278. Also confirmed by OECD reports on income and consumption inequality using a national accounts approach(note especially high consumption/income ratios indicate household income inequality is probably overestimates for the us compared to other countries), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=STD/CSTAT/WPNA(2013)10/RD&docLanguage=En And the results are consistent with Meyer and Sullivan 2017(https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23655/w23655.pdf) and Early, Ekelund, and Gramm(2022)(adjusting for household size)
Impressive article! Impressive in its combination of genetics, history and politics. Elucidating on the function and importance of elites, and on the question of elites moving from one place to another. I’ve also been wondering why I started reading that political orientation is strongly heritable, as I believed to know it was only at the most moderately heritable. Apparently - heritable goes together with cognitive ability in this case. So if your brothers or sisters (twin or not) hold completely different and random political points of view, it could be a telltale sign that your family isn’t tightly knit at all or that you are not very smart.
This is one of the most incredible articles I’ve ever read on SubStack. Great set of analyses. Well done
Amazing article but you should really split it up! Footnote 1 should be its own post.
I’m not sure if you can read my “restack” but one of my ancestors was a forty eighter who fled to Portugal - https://wilhelmachilles.wordpress.com/vor-und-wa%cc%88hrend-der-revolution-1848/
It would be really interesting to see the wider effects that this migration wave had!
Truly a fascinating article throughout, thank you for writing it.
"Third, several variables vary smoothly between the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods, including sociodemographic variables, economic structure, unemployment rates, tax revenues, eligibility for EU structural funds, geography, voter turnout, and referendum outcomes. The discontinuity generated by migrating Nazi elites is a unique exception."
So those elites made the far-right bigger, but the far-right being bigger had no measured effect on those other outcomes? Evidence that local politics don't matter, or that far-right parties don't matter?
Presumably the former. They often matter when they affect national-level policy.
It really shocks me that the "Genosphere" is surprised by Hanania's retard take on immigration: he is a (non White) immigrant. How can you expect a person that, without his ancestors' immigration in the USA, would be in Gaza to be against immigration?
Moreover, but his preference to market economy, Hanania too is a "left-leaning immigrant": his whole political position is "Clinton's sister Souljah moment". His "immigrants stop the welfare state" is a thesaurus-translation of "diversity is our strenght".
The same can be said about Kirkegaard and aNAFOly Karlin: the first is an individualistic Scandinavian scared that collectivist immigrants would export socialist Denmark in the USA, Karlin is a russian nationalist that copes his expat status with his "international human capital"...delirium.
People belive in what they are: is really this simple.
Bulverize elsewhere.
In fairness, the entire premise of your essay is that Bulverism is essentially true.
People have beliefs based on who they are, not based on independent individuals arriving at some objective truth through reasoning.
I am sorry, what does it means?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulverism
I got the meaning, not the point: I did not say "Hanania is wrong because he is an immigrant" but "you should not be surprised that he chose a wrong point on immigration because he is an immigrant".
That is effectively the same thing.
How?
Interesting points.Thanks.
A Forty-Eighter migrant was Karl Marx.
110 years ago Palestine was an undeveloped backwater that mass immigration of high human capital migrants lifted to a highly developed economy. I'm sure the current descendants of the original population really appreciate the increased GDP that the new migrant elite created.
I liked, but in fairness I would say the German immigration of that era was probably one of the most successful in history.
1) After 2020 I started to change my mind on high IQ immigration. From "it's great" to "its neutral and complicated."
High IQ immigration basically just means "Asians" and the way Asians behaved during COVID was incredibly discrediting. I would not trade wearing a mask all day for slightly higher GDP.
I would add that pretty much the entire last twenty years has been bad for Asia (they are literally going extinct of their own volition).
I would probably still welcome some 130+ IQ STEM people, but I don't really care about whether we have more mediocre desk warmers.
2) In general non-white elites and low IQ browns all favor more socialism. Asians are naturally into the administrative state and safetyism. Browns don't really have an ideology but they understand "gibsmedat". Southern White hatred of Southern Blacks helped the Southeast keep the welfare state at bay for awhile, but there really is no evidence that mass importation of Latins has done anything other then turn places like CA from Reagan to Newsome or help people like Obama defeat Romney.
The default we've seen is more immigration = democrats win elections = more welfare state. You've got to lie to yourself to get to any other conclusion.
In my experience the Indian expats vote for the Democrats, but the Chinese and Columbian tend to vote conservative and the Ukrainian can tell you what the current left progressive movement has in common with communism. I believe the Hispanics tend to be more conservative as well.
A caveat to the Chinese, I think the non politically active ones, which are most, tend to vote conservative (my dad loves Trump) but the politically active ones are all heavily left leaning. And I think it's probably the same for the Indians and other non-white minority groups
If the United States is to have immigration, it should strongly favor the highly intelligent. Intelligence is one of the most important human traits. The United States is quite capable of producing more than enough low-intelligence people to meet its needs.
>likely the most sudden and impactful blossoming forth of human capital in the history of mankind. Nowhere else has an extremely gifted and persecuted population been freed like this
What about the liberalization of the entire China after the death of Mao?
>Likewise, we see something curious when we look at probate rates by region of death: they’re clearly less common in the north!
Shouldn't they be *more* common in the north?
There are a few typos in the post:
>But before getting to that, it’s reasonable to might suggest this migration didn’t have a causal effect
>Ochsner & Roesel were able to used 1949 election data
>Europe’s Jews were like a kettle getting read to boil over
>The split among non-Jews were only 17 points in net conservatism
>This finding is selective in a who other ways
Fascinating. First random thoughts:
1) strong implication that to "destroy a group as a class" destroying its members as living bodies is necessary (something both the early Soviet and the Nazis realized to horrific results).
2) how does importing of the elites interact with how receptive the receiver society is to the ideas and beliefs they bring? Nazis moving around Austria or Southern plantation owners in the US or even Luther's travels all seem to be occuring withing ROUGHLY the same cultural milieu. Idk if it even matters in the current globalised world of ideas, but there might be a point where the imported elite beliefs are so incompatible with host culture (idk, radical Islamism or other totalitarian religiosity brought to secular north-west democracies ??) that they won't take even if carried by very able group of incomers.
3) trying to cognitively integrate this with, largely measuring as paltry, but limited by the conditions of measurement, effects of family environment on human outcomes -- but also awareness that at the edges (extremely disadvantageous, hard-abusive family environments) those effects seem to be much stronger. Perhaps the same is true in the other tail: parents mostly don't matter all that much, but extra special awful parents AND extra special able/intelligent/creative parents possessing of well formed beliefs and ideas matter significantly more. I wonder if there's any research that looks at those potentially non-linear effects.
Really good work! One question
In the beginning of the article, you mentioned that hereditary ideological effects can be attributed to genetics, tho only if the offspring is smart. Is this a claim that you hold strongly? Because imo, intelligence indicates ability to absorb information, which in my view, explains the ideological preferences of offsprings more than genetics.
I'm not sure how to answer that. It seems to be empirically supported, so I believe it, but if evidence came along showing something else more strongly, I could believe that instead.
When it comes to footnote 1, what are your thoughts on the report about the fiscal impact of migration in the netherlands("Borderless Welfare State: The Consequences of Immigration for Public Finances"), seemed to show a negative impact even when looking across the entire lifetime and across generations for most immigrants. I guess this would not be robust to the interaction effects mentioned. It would be interesting to see a study looking at say if non-immigrant populations are wealthier in places with more (low-skilled) immigrants as suggesting by a pulling up effect, even after controls. Also the section on CITO scores(dutch standardized test that strongly correlates with iq), being strongly correlated with net contributions by country of origin, given research showing that this measure correlates with other socioeconomic outcomes on this level(education is mentioned on the individual level, but see Kirkegaard, 2017), and previous correlations between national iq(Jones, 2010, see a basic meta-analysis: https://rpubs.com/EmilOWK/LCI_2017_talk), and sometimes selection(https://inquisitivebird.substack.com/p/out-of-europe-history-of-migrations used iab brain drain data) and immigrant outcomes(and those two factors + environmental impacts would be the main factors behind CITO performance).
*assuming measurement invariance for national iqs, see lasker,2019(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335239154_A_Surfeit_of_Evidence_on_Spearman's_Hypothesis) and warne,2023 for tests of this, generally showing that international measuerement invariance is tenable, even if say strict factorial invariance is not. And for educational selection, depending if the selection is direct or indirect(on a broader SES), your estimate would have to be corrected for the correlation between education and iq(if you actually wanted to estimate the results for migrants to x country).
Also when it comes to the NAS reports, it would be interesting to see the impact of adjustments for the limitation of income, taxes and transfers in CPS data, discussed by Auten & Splinter(2023), Early, Ekelund, and Gramm(2022), which also had data on income differences by race/ethnicity , etc. Data on the impact in europe generally use register data of the whole population to get around this problem.
Could you link all the papers you mentioned?
Borderless welfare state
Main report: https://demo-demo.nl/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Borderless_Welfare_State-2.pdf
Technical Appendix: https://demo-demo.nl/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Borderless_Welfare_State_Technical_Appendix-2.pdf
For other studies looking at investigating the relationship between immigrant skills in the receiving countiry and outcomes see Nordin and Rooth(2007, https://www.iza.org/de/publications/dp/2759/the-income-gap-between-natives-and-second-generation-immigrants-in-sweden-is-skill-the-explanation), there's also a revised version in the Scandinavian Journal of Economics(https://www.jstor.org/stable/40254842), and they used military iq test data in swedish to find that almost all of the income gap among 2nd generation migrants from southern europe or oustide europe can be explained by IQ. Kirkegaard 2021( used socioeconomic and cognitive data(from the danish military test) by surname but only found a ~30% mediation for general socioeconomic status(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333904065_First_Names_Cognitive_Ability_and_Social_Status_in_Denmark), and possible reasons are discussed in the paper. Some analysis of this is possible in PIAAC(which has data on literacy, numeracy and problem solving, data by immigrant generation has been previously reported in Rindermann & Thompson 2016(https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-biosocial-science/article/cognitive-competences-of-immigrant-and-native-students-across-the-world-an-analysis-of-gaps-possible-causes-and-impact/15E82DF39FBD513FD5D3869C461D6401), and Christiansen et al. 2017(https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ijsa.12189)), but sample sizes for analysis by country of origin are lacking(an exception is canada, https://www.piaac.ca/docs/PIAAC%202012%20Immigrants%20Canada%20Final%20EN.pdf).
Jones 2010(https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00206.x), found that national iq and immigrant education predicted wages in the US(with an effect size similar to the individual level one).
Kirkegaard 2017 found a strong correlation between net contributions by country of origin in denmark and finland and socioecomic status, national iq and (national) muslim%(https://openpsych.net/paper/53/)
LCI talk and ISIR conference paper were already mentioned. The only country in which measurement invariance has been consistently shown to fail is south africa, Dolan et al. 2004(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0160289603001041), Cockcroft et al. 2015(https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00297/full), but see Lasker 2021 which found that the bias was mostly against the british sample(but factor loading non-invariance indicates we're not comparing the same thing across groups).
Warne recently tested measurement invariance in 4 developing nations and found it strict measurement invariance was tenable for two(https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15332276.2023.2245007)
When it comes to the data on income measurement, the undercounting of income in the CPS, at the high end because of topcoding, for taxes and transfers(for example child anti-poverty programs shown in Meyer et al. 2020, social security and disability benefits and unemployment benefits( Larrimore, Mortenson, and Splinter (2022)). The CPS also poorly captures retirement income according to Bee and Mitchell (2017). Also see https://www.davidsplinter.com/LMS-2022-NAS-Population-Income-in-Tax-Data.pdf for a discussion of differences. This is relevant because it has a major impact on the measurement of the change in inequality(https://davidsplinter.com/AutenSplinter-Inequality-slides.pdf and https://www.cato.org/study/myth-american-income-inequality for examples), progressivity(the US probably has one of the most progressive tax + transfer systems in the world, even if it's relatively smaller, see previous slides by auten and splinter, also discussed in the book the myth of american ineuqlaity pg 276-278. Also confirmed by OECD reports on income and consumption inequality using a national accounts approach(note especially high consumption/income ratios indicate household income inequality is probably overestimates for the us compared to other countries), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=STD/CSTAT/WPNA(2013)10/RD&docLanguage=En And the results are consistent with Meyer and Sullivan 2017(https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23655/w23655.pdf) and Early, Ekelund, and Gramm(2022)(adjusting for household size)
RETVRN error? The below chart is missing Utah and has Vermont twice.
https://substackcdn.com/image/fetch/w_1272,c_limit,f_webp,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2Fb5638d4a-c79e-42ca-acda-0dc1bce228a2_964x771.png
Impressive article! Impressive in its combination of genetics, history and politics. Elucidating on the function and importance of elites, and on the question of elites moving from one place to another. I’ve also been wondering why I started reading that political orientation is strongly heritable, as I believed to know it was only at the most moderately heritable. Apparently - heritable goes together with cognitive ability in this case. So if your brothers or sisters (twin or not) hold completely different and random political points of view, it could be a telltale sign that your family isn’t tightly knit at all or that you are not very smart.